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 Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr. Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the*
Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS










Appeal from the United States District Court
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
No. 91-cr-00570-5
(Senior District Judge: Honorable Marvin Katz) 
___________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 30, 2008
Before: McKEE, NYGAARD, and SILER, Circuit Judges*
(Filed: December 12, 2008 ) 
2OPINION OF THE COURT
McKee, Circuit Judge,
Bernard Fields appeals the district court’s refusal to modify his sentence pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  For the reasons set forth below, we will vacate the district court’s order
denying Fields’ motion, and remand for reconsideration of the sentence.
I.
As we write only for the parties who are familiar with this case, a detailed discussion of
the factual and procedural history is not necessary.  We exercise plenary review of the district
court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570
(3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Fields makes numerous arguments in challenging the validity of his sentence, but his
central claim is that the district court erred in concluding that Amendment 599 of the Sentencing
Guidelines did not affect his sentence.  Amendment 599 reduced the applicable sentencing range
from life imprisonment to 324-405 months imprisonment.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), allows a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment when the
applicable sentencing range is lowered by subsequent amendment to the  Sentencing Guidelines
if the Sentencing Commission intended the amendment to be applied retroactively pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c).  See United States v. McBride, 283 F.3d 612, 614 (3d Cir. 2002).  
In imposing the sentence here, the district court considered the offense characteristic of
possessing a firearm pursuant to U.S.S.C. § 2D1.1(b)(1).   To its credit, the government now
concedes that “the court should not impose a specific offense characteristic for possession of a
firearm in calculating the guideline range for the underlying drug trafficking offense.” 
3Appellee’s Br. at 12.  The government initially “argued that this principle was not applicable in
Fields’ case,” because the enhancement was not based on the firearm involved in the offense of
conviction.  Id.  However, the government now candidly concedes that, based on “a careful
examination of the applicable law,” that fact “is irrelevant and . . . application of the 2D1.1(b)(1)
enhancement in this case is inappropriate under the amended [G]uidelines.” Id. at 12-13.  Rather,
as the government states, “[t]he district court, under 1B1.10, has discretion in determining
whether to reduce the sentence to a term within [the applicable] range, and the case should be
remanded for the court to make that decision.”  Id. at 13.  See United States v. Knobloch, 131
F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 1997).
II.
Fields also argues that he should have the benefit of the holding in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), on remand.  The government argues that we rejected this argument
when we held that Fields could not file a second motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because Booker
did not apply retroactively and was therefore not a basis for a new motion under § 2255.  The
government also argues that Booker does not apply to proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) because
they do not constitute a “full re-sentencing,” and because the policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission limit the district court’s discretion to a reduction that is within the newly calculated
Guideline range. 
We need not discuss these arguments in detail because we have already held that
resentencings pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) are limited to applying the retroactive Guideline.  See
McBride, 283 F.3d at 615 (a reduction in sentence under § 3582(c)(2) does not constitute a full
re-sentencing and the district court did not err in limiting its consideration to the effect of a
4sentencing amendment rather than considering an alleged Apprendi error).  See also Lloyd v.
United States, 407 F.3d 608, 614-16 (3d Cir. 2005) (Booker does not apply retroactively to
concluded cases). 
III.
For all of the above reasons, we will vacate the district court’s order denying Fields’ §
3582(c)(2) motion, and remand for reconsideration of an appropriate sentence within the
amended Guideline range. In doing so, we note our appreciation of the government’s candor. It is
in the best tradition of advocacy.
